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Going Beyond Climate Ethics: Virtuousness in Climate Change Initiatives 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the place of virtuousness in climate change initiatives and presents a 
framework to assess the extent of virtuousness in mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
Although some argue that climate change is fundamentally an ethical issue, compared to 
the scientific literature on climate change, the body of climate ethics literature is more 
recent and considerably smaller. According to Posas (2007), since the first warning of 
climate change by an oceanographer in 1957, the most significant milestones in terms of 
introducing an ethical perspective to climate change was the Buenos Aires Declaration in 
December, 2004. At the same time, there has been a growing interest in academia of what 
is now come to be known as ‘climate ethics’. The climate ethics discourse now includes 
philosophical contributions, such as of Singer (2002) and Gardiner (2004), and the role of 
religion in climate ethics (Posas, 2007).  
 
Despite these contributions, key intergovernmental climate change policy instruments 
such as the Kyoto Protocol and national policy documents such as Australia’s Garnaut 
Climate Change Review (Garnaut, 2008) devotes little or no ethical reasoning for its 
proposed mitigation and adaptation strategies. For example, the words ‘ethics’ and 
‘ethical’ appear only once each in the body of the report (in an IPCC quote) and in the 
reference list of the 680 page Garnaut report (September, 2008). Even those policy 
documents such as UK’s Stern Report which explicitly acknowledge the consequentialist, 
welfarist and rights views, expose its mitigation and adaptation strategies for critique due 
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to conflicting moral arguments, and thus, run the risk of losing credibility as an effective 
policy instrument. This paper explores how assessing climate change initiatives against a 
higher moral standard than that of ethics could help develop effective climate change 
policies that overcome the problem of conflicting moral reasoning in intergovernmental 
and governmental climate change policy making, thus helping to promote equity, 
distributive justice and virtue among governments, organizations and people around the 
world.  
 
Climate Ethics and Virtuousness 
According to Gardiner (2004), ‘climate change is fundamentally an ethical issue’ (p. 
556). Ethics is a ‘field of philosophical inquiry that examines concepts and their 
employment about what is right and wrong, obligatory and non-obligatory, and when 
responsibility should attach to human actions that cause harm’ (Brown et al., 2006, p.7). 
Virtuousness differs from ethics, as virtuousness goes beyond behaving within ethical 
rules, resulting in developing personal and communal excellence (Bright et al., 2006). 
Thus, virtuousness is a ‘different kind of standard that guides individuals to enact 
excellence in character and moral judgment’ (Bright et al., 2006, p.249). Examining the 
virtuousness of climate change initiatives in relation to ethics has two major benefits.  
 
First is the inability of regulatory codes such as the Kyoto Protocol to predict every 
possible ethical dilemma in initiating and managing climate change action. As Bright et 
al., (2006) point out, this is particularly the case when change is ubiquitous as in climate 
change, making it difficult to find the ‘right’ answers based on conflicting moral 
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arguments. Thus, an ethos of virtuousness, according to Bright et al., (2006), transcends 
situational dynamics and ‘enables behaviors and decisions that rise above what is merely 
expected in ethical conduct’ (p.250). The second benefit of examining virtuousness as 
opposed to ethics is that the absence of unethical behavior does not guarantee the 
presence of highly principled behavior. Cameron (2003) explains the differences between 
unethical, ethical and virtuousness-driven behaviors through a continuum of deviance 





Figure 1. Continuum illustrating differences in the characteristics of social science 
phenomena (from Bright et al., 2006, p.250). 
 
While the left side of the figure (negative deviance) is associated with harmful, unethical 
or dishonest behavior, the center projects acceptable, normal or ethical behavior. The 
right side of the continuum is associated with virtuousness or flourishing (Bright et al., 
2006), what mitigation and adaptation models should aim for. Before we examine how 
virtuousness could be integrated into mitigation and adaptation models, we need to ask 
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why we need a higher moral standard than that of ethics to develop effective climate 
change policies. Let us focus our attention on the Kyoto Protocol—the best initiative of 
the human race to combat climate change (Gardiner, 2004). It is saddled with problems. 
Thus one is entitled to question whether we have framed the climate change issue 
appropriately. Let us briefly examine the development of Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Kyoto Protocol and the Need for a Higher Moral Standard in Climate Change 
Initiatives 
Gardiner (2004) provides an excellent account of Kyoto Protocol’s development so far. 
He explains that the current state of affairs in climate change initiatives is a result of three 
main phases. Starting with the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change documented the nations’ commitment to stabilize 
‘greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ and agreed to ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’. Thus under this understanding, richer, industrialized 
nations were expected to lead in cutting emissions, while the less developed countries 
would pursue their own development and take significant action only in the future. 
Although some rich countries (including the United States, European Union, Japan, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Norway) announced voluntary stabilization levels, 
these declarations were not lived up to and their emissions continued to rise without 
constraint. It thus gave rise to the second phase of the current international move towards 
tackling climate change.  
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At the Berlin meeting in 1995, the parties agreed to accept binding constraints on their 
emissions, which in 1997 was agreed in Japan as the Kyoto Protocol. Although first 
appearing as a major success, as Gardiner (2004) aptly points out, ‘the promise of Kyoto 
turned out to be short lived’ (p. 591). With a subsequent meeting to confirm details of the 
Protocol action, the agreement broke down in Hague (2000), and the US withdrawal in 
2001 ended any real chance of Kyoto’s success. However, in the same year, the Bonn and 
Marrakesh meetings gave rise to the third phase where full agreement was negotiated and 
participating governments’ ratification was sought. With the recent ratification of 
Australia, Kyoto Protocol has survived and efforts to combat global climate change 
appear to be still on track. However, several argue that Kyoto Protocol is deeply flawed; 
both in its substance and its background assumptions (see Gardiner, 2004).  
 
The first substantive flaw is that Kyoto does very little to limit emissions. With 
concessions given to some countries to encourage them to ratify Kyoto, research projects 
that even if full compliance is followed by the signatories, their emissions would have 
increased by 9 percent above 2000 levels by the end of the first commitment period. 
Coupled with emissions growth in the developing countries, another substantial global 
increase by 2012 is to be expected. However, Gardiner points out some merits in Kyoto 
in that the current agreement has to be valued procedurally (as a necessary first step), 
symbolically (for showing that some kind of agreement is possible), geopolitically (for 
showing that the rest of the world can act without the United States) and as simply the 
best that is possible under current conditions (p. 592).  
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The second substantive criticism of Kyoto is on its weak compliance mechanism. This 
criticism arises because of the weak or little enforcement powers of Kyoto. While on the 
one hand, enforcement is not binding on any country that fails to ratify the amendment 
necessary to punish it (Barrett 2003, p. 386), on the other, the penalties take the form of 
more demanding targets in the next decade’s commitment period—but parties can take 
this into account when negotiating their targets for that commitment period.  
 
Perhaps the most significant flaw of them all is Kyoto’s flaws in its background 
assumptions. The Protocol assumes an acceptable deal on climate can be made without 
addressing the wider issue of international justice. For example, the disparity in the 
treatment between cost of coping climate change and cost of preventing future climate 
change (Shue 1992, p. 384). The Kyoto Protocol focus is on cost-effectiveness thus, 
marginalizing the attention to ethical issues.  
 
Thus we can identify several reasons for the failure of Kyoto. One is due to reasons 
including the political role of energy interests, confusion about scientific uncertainties 
and economic costs, and the inadequacies of the international system (Gardiner, 2004). 
Here the role of United States features prominently. Prominent thinkers like Peter Singer 
claim that as a nation with 4 percent of world’ population and emissions at 25 percent of 
global GHG emissions, United States role in weakening Kyoto in the early meetings and 
subsequent abandoning of the treaty is unethical that the moral case for economic 
sanctions against the United States is stronger than it was for apartheid South Africa on 
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the basis that the South African regime’s harm was localized to its citizens whereas 
United States harms citizens of other countries. 
 
If Kyoto Protocol was the best initiative of the human race to combat climate change, and 
it saddled with the problems as outlined before, one is entitled to question whether we 
have framed the climate change issue appropriately. As pointed out earlier, although 
climate change is seen fundamentally as an ethical issue, the ethical dimensions of the 
climate change problem have been given very little attention in major policy documents 
such as the Kyoto Protocol. Even if due attention was paid to ethical issues from the 
inception of the Kyoto movement, this paper argues that a higher moral standard is 
required to address challenging ethical issues such as the intergenerational problem. 
Assessing the virtuousness of climate change initiatives through modeling could generate 
more robust, equitable and just outcomes that could avoid further pitfalls in the combat 
against climate change.  
 
Applying Virtuousness to Climate Change Strategies 
Peterson and Seligman (2004) thematically captured common virtues across most 
cultures and nationalities. Based on these, Bright et al., (2006) propose that virtuousness 
is a form of character excellence that can be attributed to individuals and also to 
organizations (p.251). They identify three key elements of virtuousness: human impact, 
moral goodness and unconditional societal benefit. Let us consider each of these in light 
of the allocation problem of atmospheric targets or GHG emission reduction targets 
among people, organizations and governments. 
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The first criterion of virtuousness is the extent of human impact. The virtuousness model 
developed by Bright et al., (2006) suggests that allocations should be based on the extent 
of resilience, well being and improvement of livelihood brought about by the respective 
initiatives. If the process includes future generations as well, then the course to follow 
would be to allocate responsibility to people, organizations and governments in a way 
that maximizes the positive human impact to all generations. No generation should have 
more access to the climate than others. Thus, the first element of virtuousness demands 
that national governments, organizations and people should assess whether their proposed 
strategies are designed to generate maximum positive human impact.  
 
To be considered virtuous, mitigation and adaptation strategies should also pass the moral 
goodness test which is based on the concept of ‘character traits in people and 
organisations that are seen as desirable’ (Bright, 2006, p.753). What is commonly 
construed as ‘the good’ is defined within the boundaries of organizing communities, and 
‘the common good is achieved when each person contributes to the whole in accord with 
his or her abilities and with the awareness of the legitimate needs of others’ (Arjoon, 
2000, p.165). The challenge here is assessing whether the mitigation and adaptation 
strategies are based on a motivation of human excellence that transcends instrumental 
reciprocity, i.e., without intent to induce a specific response in or from others (Peterson 
and Seligman, 2004). Decisions should be made based on the perspective that a choice is 
‘the right thing to do’, even in the absence of clearly definable benefits. For example, 
when behavior is designed to acquire benefit for the national government or to create a 
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reciprocal arrangement, as in the case of delaying or minimizing climate change action so 
that no action is required until other nations agree to act, cannot be defined as generating 
moral goodness (see Weiser and Zadek, 2000). As moral goodness is based on the 
concept of character traits in people, government and organizations that are seen as 
desirable, the common good in climate change action is achieved when people, 
governments and organizations contribute to the whole according to their abilities and 
with the awareness of the legitimate needs of others. Then, in the context of our 
allocation problem, if a government voluntarily accepts the allocation figure because it is 
‘the right thing to do’, then this government’s climate change initiative to accept the 
emission target would appear to generate moral goodness. But is there another mitigation 
and/or adoption strategy this government could adopt that could generate a greater 
amount of moral good? Thus assessing the second element of virtuousness becomes 
difficult because the intent of accepting the emission target is a critical factor in assessing 
the moral good of different alternatives.  
 
Finally, any mitigation and adaptation strategy should meet the unconditional social 
benefit test. This idea is consistent with the Aristotelian notion of eudemonia, ‘which 
holds that well-being is not a consequence of virtuous action, but rather an inherent 
aspect of such action’ (Park and Peterson, 2003). Unconditional societal benefit is the 
‘intention to create goods of first intent and to prudently use goods of second intent to 
instrumentally bring benefit to society’ (Bright et al., 2006, p.753). ‘Goods of first 
intent’, a chief good which in itself is worthy of pursuit, such as concern for others and 
common good refer to virtuousness (Bright, 2006, p.752). On the other hand, the pursuit 
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of goods of second intent, those that are good for the ‘sake of obtaining something else 
such as profit, prestige and power’ (ibid), is amoral. In the light of findings such as of 
Agarwal et al., (1999), that ‘in 1996, one U.S. citizen emitted as much as . . . 19 Indians, 
30 Pakistanis, 107 Bangladeshis . . . and 269 Nepalis’ (p. 107), purely instrumental 
motives might come into play when allocating atmospheric targets or GHG emission 
reduction targets among people, organizations and governments. The respective stances 
that national governments hold on to can change the intrinsic nature of climate change 
activity or inactivity into ‘another technique of manipulation and discipline’ (Gergen, 
1990, p.154), thereby destroying the inherent virtuousness of the action in the first place. 
In our allocation example, if a government accepts GHG emissions target for the sake of 
obtaining something else such as increasing trade, then any good generated from such 
initiatives are classed as goods of second intent, and without virtue. However, if goods of 
second intent, in this case increasing trade, are produced incidentally as a byproduct 
while pursuing first order goods (accepting GHG emission targets), it is likely to generate 
virtuousness (Bright et al., 2006).   
 
Conclusion 
While the brief discussion above attempted to demonstrate the benefit of using the 
virtuousness principle to climate change problems, it also highlights the practical 
challenges of assessing the extent of virtuousness generated by the three elements. Bright 
et al. (2006), while operationalizing virtuousness in the context of downsizing, identify 
two types of virtuousness. As opposed to tonic virtuousness, which is generally present as 
in integrity, hope, kindness and virtuous purpose, the type of virtuousness that is relevant 
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to climate change initiatives is phasic virtuousness. This type manifests as a response to 
an event such as the September 11 or the Asian tsunami or in this case, the impact of 
climate change which is being already felt by many people around the globe (see 
Fernando, 2007). Two key indicators of phasic virtuousness are responsibility and 
forgiveness. Bright et al., (2006) contend that responsibility is linked to theories of social 
justice and closely linked to empathy. People who take responsibility generally feel a 
sense of identity with others. Forgiveness is more likely when offenders take 
responsibility for their actions and can take place at the collective level when government 
and organizations adopt a prosocial response to the violation or damage, as in the case of 
damage already done to the climate.  
 
Thus mitigation and adaption models could include aspects of virtuousness to examine 
the generation of virtue among different intergovernmental and governmental strategies. 
Such models could result in more robust, equitable and just outcomes that could avoid 
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